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Abstract: The paper confirms that the provisions of fiscal federalism laid out in the Indian 
Constitution are connected to the legacy of the British rule in India. Applying historical 
analysis the author divides the period from the starting of British imperial administration in 
India to the enactment of Indian Constitution into five different phases on the basis of the 
evolution of Centre-Province financial relations. The principles of fiscal federalism in India 
gradually evolved from highly centralized fiscal governance during the initial period of the 
British rule until being manifested in the Constitution. Various parliamentary enactments, 
executive directions, committees and commissions as well as individual intervention 
contributed to this transformation. The paper further lays out the unique features of the 
Indian Constitution such as mutually exclusive tax domains and various mechanisms 
addressing fiscal imbalances due to the Government of India Act of 1935 enacted by the 
British Parliament. It concludes that while British authorities designed the system of fiscal 
administration in India after their preferences, the makers of the Indian Constitution preferred 
to retain the same provisions with minor variations in the Constitution of independent India.                  
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Introduction 
The provisions of fiscal federalism under Indian Constitution are not, as in the cases 
of many other provisions, result of any indigenous thought process. They are, to a 
great extent, indebted to the previous constitutional forms that have been developed 
in the country during British rule. The British Government assumed direct 
sovereignty over the territories of the East India Company in India in 1858 and ruled 
the country for about a century. During this long period of imperial rule, principles of 
fiscal federalism were developed through parliamentary enactments and executive 
directions.   
Based on the major developments from the year 1858, when the British Crown 
assumed direct sovereignty over the Indian territory, to the year 1950, when India 
became a Sovereign Republic, the evolution of fiscal federalism in India can be 
broadly divided into five phases: (1) Conceptualizing decentralised finance: 1858 to 
1871 (2) Informal decentralization of finances: 1871 to 1919 (3) Formal 
decentralization of finances: 1919 to 1935 (4) Decentralization to federal finances: 
1935 to 1947; and (5) Starting of Constitutional fiscal federalism: 1947 to 1950. 
This paper attempts to highlight the important schemes, enactments, and 
regulations etc., during these periods which have made significant contributions in 
the field of Centre-state financial relations in India. 
 
1. Conceptualising decentralised finance: 1858 to1871 
The period from 1858 to 1871 did not make any significant contribution towards 
decentralising the financial administration in India. In the initial years, the principle of 
rigid centralisation got prominence and was implemented rigorously. When the 
Crown took over the administration, the status of financial administration was 
alarming. Nothing like an annual budget existed and it hardly followed any 
standardized system of accounting.  
Mr. James Wilson was made the first financial member of the Governor General’s 
Council. Under the system then introduced, the central Government retained the 
entire control of finance and made grants of money at its discretion to meet the 
demands of the Local Governments. The Local Governments were collecting the 
greater part of the revenue merely as the agents of the central government. The 
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result was that the former was left with no direct interest in the result of collection 
since the whole amount went to the common fund, managed by the central authority, 
which controlled the smallest details of every branch of the expenditure (Kale 
1917).1 Samuel Laing, who succeeded James Wilson, was the first person to 
propose to grant some financial powers, including power to taxation, to the 
provinces. His proposal was that the provincial governments should be vested with 
the power to raise money by taxation for financing public works, as the Imperial 
revenues were inadequate. 
Finance Minister William Massey (1866-68) was an ardent supporter of 
decentralisation of finance. He was of the opinion that "in the vast and various 
provinces which are united under the dominion of the Crown throughout the 
continent of India, there are many sources of revenue which might be made 
available for local purposes, but which could not be used for imperial objects without 
giving rise to just complaints of partial exaction or even breach of faith”(Government 
of India 1867).His principles were embodied in a scheme of decentralisation of 
finance formulated by Col. Strachey. According to Strachey scheme, roads, jails, 
education, and medical services should be transferred to the provinces. It was 
further suggested that one-sixteenth of the land revenue and one-fourth of the 
proceeds of licence tax should be allotted to the provinces. The scheme 
recommended that the Provinces should be empowered to augment their revenue 
by imposing additional taxes and cesses on the existing taxes (Government of India 
1867). 
Lord Mayo who became the Governor-General in 1870 started implementing the 
recommendations of Laing and Strachey. For enhancing the fiscal powers of the 
Provinces and making them more responsible in the fields of financial 
administration, Lord Mayo issued a resolution on December 14, 1870.  
The first phase of the financial decentralisation ended with the steps taken by Lord 
Mayo. During this phase nothing significant took place for decentralising the 
financial administration except having some serious considerations regarding such a 
system. The schemes and plans during this period were mainly oriented to inculcate 
                                               
1
 He points out that this position of the subordinate Governments was most galling to the Central 
Government and the new system that aimed to set right the economy, in fact led to extravagance. 
The Provincial Governments were tempted to ask for more than they expected to get and expended 
every pie that they received when they could have managed with less. 
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a sense of financial responsibility in the Provincial Governments and to reduce the 
financial burden of the Central Government.   
2. Informal Decentralisation of finances: 1871 to 1991 
The period from 1871 to 1919 witnessed a gradual process of progressive 
devolution of financial authority from the Central government to the Provincial 
governments. In 1871 Lord Mayo took up the issue of decentralisation of finance as 
part of a plan for restoring equilibrium to the Imperial finances, which were in a state 
of chronic deficit. Under the Mayo Scheme, a Provincial Financial Settlement was 
laid down in which the provinces were to get more financial powers.  
 
a. Provincial Financial Settlements  
Under the Provincial Financial Settlements, certain heads of expenditures were 
assigned to the Provinces. Receipts under the corresponding heads were assigned 
to the respective provinces for meeting expenditure under those heads. However, as 
the receipts under these heads were not commensurate with the expenditure, it was 
decided to continue with the existing system of fixed grants from the Central 
revenues.2  
The Provincial Financial Settlements did not help to improve the provincial economy. 
On the other hand it has resulted in increasing the horizontal imbalances among the 
provinces. The Provinces were empowered to supplement their revenue by 
additional taxation, which under the existing arrangements could only mean 
increased burden on the poor (Jather& Beri 1932). However, the Mayo Scheme had 
put the process of decentralization of finances into motion, which could not be 
reversed.  
 
b. Provincial Financial Settlement widened 
                                               
2
 Under the Provincial Financial Settlements, the Provinces were given a total grant of Rs. 4688711/- in 
lump sum. This amount was distributed as between the several provinces by the Government of 
India, on the basis of the requirements of each province, as shown by the accounts of the 
Government of India. 
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In 1877, some steps were taken by Lord Lytton with the help of his Finance Member, 
Sir John Strachey to strengthen the decentralisation of finance.  More heads of 
expenditure were transferred to the provinces (Government of India 1877). But, 
instead of granting power to tax these subjects the provinces were given a share in 
the Central revenues. Certain heads of revenue, such as excise, stamps, law and 
justice fees, proceeds of the license tax and some minor railway receipts were 
allotted to the provincial governments. It was stipulated that the revenue from these 
sources was to be taken in part by the provincial governments. But if the provincial 
governments showed any surplus over an estimated figure, one half of the surplus 
should be given to the central government. In case of a deficit, the central 
government agreed to bear half the loss.  
 
c. Quinquennial Arrangement 
The ‘Provincial Financial Settlements’ under Mayo Scheme were subject to revision 
annually. But from 1882 they were made on quinquennial basis by Lord Ripon.   
The quinquennial settlements substituted the ‘assigned revenue’ with the ‘divided 
heads’ or ‘shared revenues’. It abolished the system of fixed annual grants from the 
centre to the provinces and introduced resource sharing between the central and 
provincial governments. The revenue heads were divided into ‘Imperial Heads’, 
‘Provincial Heads’ and ‘Divided Heads’. The centre retained revenue from the 
Imperial Heads and the provinces from the Provincial Heads. The revenue from the 
Divided Heads was distributed between them. Since the total revenue from 
Provincial Heads and Divided Heads were insufficient to meet the needs of the 
provincial governments, a share of land revenue was made available to them, 
together with fixed cash assignments. New settlements were made after the expiry 
of five years. However, at the end of fifth year the balances standing to the credit of 
provinces were taken over by the central government. 
The Ripon Scheme is important for three major reasons. Firstly, steps were taken for 
the first time to divide the total resources of revenue under various heads. Secondly, 
instead of granting a fixed annual grant to the provinces, they were given a share in 
growing sources of revenue. Thirdly, the major source of the revenue, i.e., land 
revenue, was made as a divisible income. Perhaps the origin of resource sharing 
under different heads existing under the Constitution of India can be attributed to the 
Ripon Scheme.  
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The ‘Provincial Financial Settlements’ were made in 1887, 1892, and 1897 without 
any change in principle.3 In the first and second settlements, the shares of the 
Provinces were reduced.4 However, the third revision in 1896-97 increased the 
share of the Provinces. In this settlement, an estimate was made on the expenditure 
on provincial services in each province, and an adequate proportion of provincial 
revenues were set aside. ‘Provincial Financial Settlement’ was viewed with 
contempt by many writers as the real purpose of it was mainly to salvage the 
Imperial finance from the crisis which it was facing for more than three and a half 
decades (Banerjea 1939, Chand 1930).5 According to K.T. Shah, “the governing 
principle in the thirty years of provincial finance, since its inauguration by Lord Mayo, 
had remained unaffected: administrative convenience- for the Government of India 
almost invariably" (Shah 1929).6 
 
d. Quasi -Permanent Settlements 
Lord Curzon drew up a scheme of quasi-permanent nature in 1904 to get rid of the 
defects existed under the quinquennial arrangement. The quasi -permanent 
settlement was on the foundation of three principles: (a) The provinces must be 
given a more permanent interest in their revenue and expenditure, (b) The ratio of 
the revenue assigned to the provinces to their expenditure should be approximately 
the same ratio of the central revenue to the central expenditure, and (c) The 
provincial assignment must include a slightly larger share of growing revenues. 
Under the quasi-permanent settlement, there were subjects exclusively allotted to 
the Government of India and the Provinces and certain revenues were shared 
between them. The Provincial Government also secured lump-sum grants from the 
                                               
3
 The Imperial Government did not make the settlement in 1901-02 due to certain difficulties they were 
facing. 
4
 In 1887, the Centre collected seventy five percent proceeds of revenue from divided heads and the 
Provinces were given only the balance twenty five percent. 
5
 Banerjea stated that “the real motive of the scheme was to give relief to the Centre rather than to 
provide larger revenues to the Provinces” while Chand held that the “only consideration which really 
weighed with the Government of India was that of administrative convenience”. 
6
 Schah observed that the Government of India was the absolute master of the situation; they varied 
and re-formed the contracts at their discretion, or for their convenience. Neither borrowing on their 
own credit, nor additional or supplementary taxation on their own hook, was allowed to the 
Provinces, who therefore remained irretrievably tied to the apron strings of the Central Government. 
pp. 93-94. 
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Central surpluses. In order to make up the gap between the provincial revenue and 
expenditure, a fixed cash assignment under the Land Revenue was assigned to 
them. With respect to famine relief, an arrangement was made by the Central 
Government to set aside some amount to meet any contingency.7 
In 1908 the ‘Royal Commission on Decentralisation’ was appointed to investigate 
the whole issue of financial relations with special reference to expenditure control. 
Though the Commission expressed ‘general satisfaction’ with the existing financial 
relations between the Government of India and the Provincial Governments, it 
argued for a reorganization of the system (Royal Commission 1909). 
The Government of India, by considering the reasoning of the Commission, made 
certain modifications in the fresh settlements of 1911-12. They sought to convert the 
fixed assignment into completely provincialised revenues from heads that were then 
divided. The settlement of 1911 wholly provincialised the forests revenue and 
expenditure. In respect of excise and land revenue, the allocation was variable 
among Provinces.8  Accordingly, cash assignments to the Provinces were reduced in 
proportion to the accretion in revenues from the above changes. Provincial claims 
for independent powers of borrowing and taxation were not accepted by the central 
government (Government of India 1912). 
 
e. Permanent Settlements 
The ‘quasi- permanent settlement’ was converted into ‘Permanent Settlement’ in 
1912 by Lord Hardinge. Under this settlement the Government of India received the 
whole revenue under the heads of opium, salt, customs, tributes from native states, 
post office, telegraph, railways, mint and military receipts. It was responsible for the 
expenditure on the corresponding heads. Of the provincial revenue, about two third 
was derived from the three divided heads of land revenue, excise and assessed 
taxes. The system of grants was retained. The ‘Permanent Settlement’ remained in 
operation till 1918-19.  
                                               
7
 It set aside every year a sum roughly equal to the famine liabilities of each province to the credit of 
that province, and utilizing that accumulated reserve when a famine occurred, without affecting its 
normal resources. If this did not suffice to meet the particular liability, the Imperial and the provincial 
government concerned must meet the excess equally. 
8
 Excise entirely in Bombay, and to the extent of three quarter in the Central and the United Provinces; 
Land revenue – half in Punjab and five of eight in Burma. 
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During this phase the Government of India continued to be constitutionally 
responsible for exercising the general executive supervision of the administration of 
the provinces, in the collection of revenues, and in the administration of services 
assigned to them. The provincial governments were not granted with any powers of 
independent taxation, and were not allowed to borrow even on their own credit in the 
open market. This arrangement was criticized by Shah (1929) in the following 
words: “The Provincial Governments, up to 1920, owed no responsibility to the 
people they governed. The Government of India were themselves an absolute and 
irresponsible bureaucracy; but they owed a shadow of responsibility to Parliament. 
They accordingly refused to concede any powers of independent taxation, direct or 
indirect, to the provinces, on political as well as financial grounds. And, lest 
provincial competition with the Government of India, committed to heavy projects of 
material development, requiring considerable annual borrowing, should prejudice 
the credit of the Central Government, they likewise declined to allow provinces to 
borrow on their own credit in the open market.”  The provincial budgets needed the 
approval of the Government of India. Even though some subjects of revenue and 
expenditure were granted to the Provinces there was no real fiscal autonomy to 
them. Under all settlements, the subjects also substantially remained same. There 
was a direct control by the central government over the fiscal governance of the 
provinces and they had to depend heavily on the central grants to meet their 
ordinary administrative expenses.              
3. Period of formal decentralization: 1919 to 1935 
In the history of fiscal federalism in India, the period from 1919 to 1935 is 
remarkable for the considerable change in the approaches of the Government of 
India in respect of the devolution of resources to the provincial governments. 
Several Committees and Commissions were appointed to look into the matter of 
financial decentralisation and their recommendations helped to develop a 
decentralised financial administration in India. To begin with, the Montague-
Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms was submitted in 1918, which led to 
the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919. It was followed by Indian 
Statutory Commission, 1930, First Peel Committee, 1931, White Paper on Indian 
Constitutional Reforms, 1931, Percy Committee, 1932, Second Peel Committee, 
1932, and Parliamentary Committee, 1934. Role of these committees and 
commissions in developing a formal decentralisation of finance in India are briefly 
given below.  
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a. Montague-Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms and the 
Government of India Act, 1919 
Lord Chelmsford was appointed as the Governor General of India in 1916 and soon 
after his arrival he declared that “the endowment of British India as an integral part 
of the British Empire with self- government was the goal of British rule” (Banerjee 
1949).To achieve these goals, he was of the opinion that the Constitution of India 
required major and radical reforms. E.S. Montague, the then Secretary of State, 
came to India in 1917 on an invitation made by the Governor General to study and 
report about the necessary constitutional reforms in India. The Montague-
Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms was submitted in 1918.   
The Mont-Ford Report expressed strong disapproval against the existing financial 
relations between the Centre and the provinces for the control and interference of 
the Central Government in provincial matters.9  An important proposal of the Report 
was to dispense with the system of ‘divided heads’ and to allot the residual power of 
taxation to the Provinces (Montague& Chelmsford 1918).10 The Provincial subjects 
were divided into “Reserved” and “Transferred” and the Governor in Council 
controlled the “Reserved Subjects” while the Governor acting with the Ministers 
controlled the Transferred Subjects”.11 Finance, land revenue, famine relief, irrigation 
and waterways, mines, electricity etc., were included in the reserved subjects while 
the transferred subjects included local self government, education, public works, and 
excise.12 The sources of revenue of the provinces included the receipts from 
provincial subjects, a share in the income- tax and taxes on specific items.  
                                               
9
 The Report made a major change in the approach on the basis that provincial autonomy could be 
achieved only if the Provinces were made independent of the Union for the means of provincial 
development and consequently the report made certain serious searches for a new basis of division 
of financial resources between the Centre and the Provinces. 
10
 It proposed that “an idea should first be made of the scale of expenditure required for the upkeep 
and development of the services which clearly appertain to the Indian sphere; that resources with 
which to meet this expenditure should be secured to the Indian Government; and that all other 
revenues should then be handed over to the Provincial Governments, which will thenceforth be held 
wholly responsible for the development of all provincial services.” (§ 209) 
11
 The Executive Government of a Province consisted of two parts: one comprising the Governor and 
his Executive Council, and the other consisting of the Governor acting with his Ministers. 
12
 This system of dyarchy did not work well due to political and administrative reasons and the 
Government was forced to replace it with a responsible unitary government in each province under 
the Government of India Act, 1935. 
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The Report also provided for a complete separation of central and provincial 
budgets, which were until then interlinked and the Central Government could make 
use of any surplus in the provincial exchequer (Montague& Chelmsford 1918).13 
With regard to provincial taxation, the report recommended for limited powers to the 
provinces.14  In respect of provincial borrowings, the Report recommended that the 
provinces’ power of borrowing should be exercised only with the previous sanction 
of the Government of India even if such borrowings were to be effected locally.15  
Since the ‘divided heads’ had been proposed to be abolished and resources 
rearranged, it was calculated that the provinces would have a surplus and the 
Government of India would have a deficit. This deficit was proposed to be made 
good by fixed contributions by the provinces, which would form the first charge upon 
the provincial revenues.16 To advise on the amounts of provincial contributions the 
‘Financial Relations Committee’ was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord 
Meston.17  
The Meston Committee suggested that the basis of provincial contribution should 
not be the estimated budgetary surplus of the provinces but should be the increased 
spending power of the provinces. It recommended that the standard contributions 
should be computed on the basis of the relative taxable capacity of the provinces 
and other economic factors. Provincial contributions under the Meston Settlement 
during the 1920s provided perhaps the only example of transfer of funds from the 
provinces to the centre in the long history of fiscal federalism in India (Sury 1992). 
The Government of India Bill based on the Mont-Ford Report was introduced in the 
House of Commons and it became an Act on December 23, 1919, and came into full 
operation on the first day of January 1921. The Government of India Act, 1919 
marked the beginning of formal decentralisation of finances in India. It abolished the 
system of ‘divided heads’ of revenue and provided for separate heads of revenue 
both for the centre and the provinces. Conferring the right of taxation and power of 
borrowing on the provinces was a milestone in the evolution of federal finances. The 
                                               
13
 § 208 
14
 Requirement of the previous sanction of the Government of India and the Governor General’s power 
of veto made this recommendation meaningless (§ 210). 
15
 § 211 
16
 87 percent of gross provincial surplus was proposed to be contributed to the central Government.   
17
 The Committee was to advice on: (a) the contributions by various provinces for the year 1921-22; (b) 
modifications to be made in the provincial contributions; (c) future financing of the provincial loan 
account; and (d) share of income tax to the Government of Bombay.   
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Act divided the subjects of legislations into two; ‘Central’ and ‘Provincial’.18 The 
subjects of legislations were given in two schedules. With regard to the subjects 
listed in schedule I the provinces could levy taxes without the previous sanction of 
the Governor-General.19  On the subjects of schedule II, the provinces could permit 
local bodies to levy tax, without prior sanction of the Governor-General. However, 
the Governor-General-in-Council had power to add any new tax to either schedule.  
 
b. Indian Statutory Commission, 1930 
In November 1927, Parliament appointed the Indian Statutory Commission under 
the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon to enquire into the working of the system of 
Government of India Act, 1919. Report of the Commission was published on May 
27, 1930.   
The Commission recommended the abolition of diarchy in the provinces and the 
establishment of unitary administration by doing away with the classification of 
subjects into “reserved” and “transferred”. It did not favor the system of grants-in-aid 
as it involved some measure of control which ran counter to the whole trend of 
constitutional development embodied in the recommendations of the Commission. 
Instead, it proposed for the creation of a provincial fund. This fund was to “be fed by 
products of taxes, voted by the Federal Assembly representing provincial units, but 
collected centrally” (Government of India, 1930). 
Financial Advisor to the Commission, Sir Walter Layton made recommendations 
with regard to the division of resources between the centre and the provinces, which 
                                               
18
 The Central subjects included military, naval and aerial matters, foreign relations and relations with 
native states, railways, communications of military importance, post and telegraphs, currency and 
coinage, public debt, sources of imperial revenue, criminal and civil law and procedure, 
ecclesiastical administration and All-India services, central institutions of Scientific and Industrial 
research and all other matters not specifically declared as provincial subjects. The Provincial 
subjects included local self government, education, medical administration, sanitation and public 
health, public works, agriculture, development of industries, excise, civil veterinary department, 
fisheries, co-operative societies, famine relief, land revenue administration, irrigation, forests, 
administration of justice, police, prisons, inspection of factories, labour questions, provincial 
borrowings and agency functions.      
19
 The taxes mentioned in Schedule I were: (a) tax on land put to uses other than agricultural, (b) tax 
on succession, (c) tax on any form of betting or gambling permitted by law, (d) tax on 
advertisement, (c) tax on amusements, (f) stamp duty, (g) registration fee, and (h) stamp duties 
other than duties of which the amount was fixed by the Indian Legislation. 
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were accepted by the commission. He recommended for a re-allocation of resources 
between the central and the provincial Governments, and suggested imposition of a 
number of new taxes. According to his recommendations, the total tax revenue 
should be categorised into four such as (i) Taxes collected and spent by the centre; 
(ii) Taxes collected and spent by the provinces; (iii) Taxes collected by the centre 
and distributed among the provinces on the basis of origin; and (iv) Taxes collected 
by the centre and distributed among the provinces on the basis of population. 
The recommendations of the Indian Statutory Commission were considered in 
connection with the proposals for constitutional changes, which were discussed at 
the Round Table Conferences in London.  
 
c. First Peel Committee, 1931 
In the Second Round Table Conference20 a committee with Lord Peel as the 
chairman was appointed to investigate into the fiscal relations between the central 
and the provincial Governments and make necessary suggestions.21 The main 
recommendations of the First Peel Committee were: (i) Income Tax should be levied 
and collected by the central Government, but the entire proceeds of it should be 
assigned to the provinces; (ii) Central tax revenues should be mostly derived from 
indirect taxation; (iii) Any resultant central deficit should be met from provincial 
contributions which should not continue beyond fifteen years; (iv) If after fifteen 
years there was any surplus in the central finances, the central government should 
allocate the surplus to the units instead of reducing taxation; (v) Constitution itself 
should lay down the proportions in which such funds should be divided among the 
units; and (vi) an expert committee should be appointed to lay down the criteria by 
which the proceeds of income tax should be allocated among the provinces.   
 
d. Percy Committee, 1932 
As recommended by the First Peel Committee, an expert committee under the 
chairmanship of Lord Percy was appointed. The Committee rejected the existing 
system of distribution based on "origin", "population" and “collection" for not being 
                                               
20
 Commenced on September 1, 1931.  
21
 Also known as the First Peel Committee. 
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equitable.22  The principal recommendations of the Percy Committee were (i) 
Income Tax should be shared between the centre and the provinces; (ii) The 
provinces should get a share of the proceeds of personal income tax of local 
incidences, personal super tax on the basis of collection from their residents, and a 
share of the tax on non-residents and undistributed profits of companies on the 
basis of population; (iii) Share of the provinces should be fixed for a period, subject 
to a revision in  every five years; (iv) The central government should have power to 
levy surcharge on any tax levied and collected by it; and (v) Central grants should 
be distributed to the provinces on the basis of population. 
 
e. White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1931 
The British Government in December 1931 issued a White Paper containing 
proposals for the Indian constitutional reforms which also contained certain financial 
proposals. The main financial proposals contained in the White Paper were (i) An 
amount not less than 50 per cent and not more than 75 per cent of the net proceeds 
of tax on income other than agricultural income should be assigned to the provinces 
on a prescribed basis; (ii) Central and provincial governments should have power to 
levy surcharges on income tax for their individual purposes; (iii) Proceeds of 
agricultural income tax and corporation tax should go to the provincial and the 
central government respectively; (iv) Central government should grant to the 
provinces the whole or a part of the proceeds of salt duty, excise duty on 
commodities included in Central List and export duties; and (v) Terminal taxes and 
death duties should be levied and collected by the central government but the 
proceeds of which should be distributed among the provinces. 
 
f. Second Peel Committee, 1932 
The Reports of the Peel Committee and Percy Committee and proposals in the 
White Paper were considered by the Federal Structure Committee and decided that 
the distribution of subjects of taxation and devolution of finances should be 
                                               
22
 The Committee was of the opinion that the allocation based on ‘origin’ was theoretically 
commendable but would result into arbitrariness. Distribution based on ‘population’ was not fully 
scientific but could be adopted in certain circumstances and the criteria of ‘collection’ would be 
prejudicial to some Provinces. 
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considered afresh. A Sub-Committee was constituted for this purpose andwas 
headed by Lord Peel. However, the second Peel Committee merely endorsed the 
recommendations of the Percy Committee without making any significant 
suggestions.  
 
g. Parliamentary Committee, 1934 
In 1933-34, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Indian Constitutional Reforms 
examined the question of allocation and devolution of resources. The Committee 
generally agreed with the proposals made in the White Paper and suggested that 
the provincial share of income tax should be prescribed by an Order-in-Council and 
the share of the provinces should not exceed half of the net revenue from income 
tax. It further recommended that the provinces should be prevented from imposing 
surcharges on personal income tax.  
Government of India Act, 1919 marked the beginning of a formal decentralisation of 
finance between the centre and the provinces. Strict control of the centre over the 
provincial finances was, to some degree, avoided and autonomy to a limited extent 
was given to the provincial governments. Although, under the Government of India 
Act, 1919 fiscal powers were demarcated between the centre and the provinces and 
the possibilities of overlapping were minimised, the central government was vested 
with overriding powers. The fundamental issue was that the fiscal powers of the 
provinces were not derived from a sovereign constitution but were delegated by the 
supreme central government. Such a system could not be considered as a federal 
system. But, that is not a reason to undermine the contribution made by the 
Government of India Act, 1919 for setting up a federal system in the long run. The 
role of the Government of India Act, 1919 is that it formalised the financial relations 
between the central and the provincial governments, which accelerated the process 
of establishing a constitutional fiscal federalism.    
4. Decentralisation to federal finances: 1935 to 1947 
The Government of India Act, 1935 was passed into law and received the Royal 
assent on August 4, 1935 and came into force on April 1, 1937.23  Although the 
                                               
23
 Except Part II (Federation) and Part II (Federal Railway Authority) 
Gopa Kumar, Historical Evolution of Federal Finances in India  40   
 
 
political leadership did not accept (Sikri 1979) 24, it marked the turning point in the 
evolution of federal financial relation. It provided the framework for the Centre-
province financial relations as incorporated in the present Constitution of India (Basu 
1987).25 For the purpose of demarcation and distribution of legislative powers 
between the central and provincial Governments, three Lists were provided in the 
Seventh Schedule to the Act. Central government and provincial governments had 
exclusive power to legislate upon the subjects enumerated under List I and List II 
respectively. In the case of subjects contained in List III, both the levels of 
government could legislate with dominance to central legislation over the provincial 
legislation in case of conflict.26  Lists I and II contained subjects of taxation whereas 
List III contained hardly any subject of tax.  
The Government of India Act, 1935 did not bring any major change in the distribution 
of subjects between the centre and the provinces. It only reiterated the earlier 
principle of dividing the subjects between centre and provinces giving prominence to 
the former. The scheme of distribution of resources between the central and 
provincial governments under the Act could be classified into five as follows:    
a. Taxes levied, collected and retained by the central government 
b. Taxes levied, collected and retained by the provincial governments 
c. Taxes levied and collected by the central government but assigned to the 
provinces 
d. Taxes levied and collected by the central government but shared with the 
provinces 
e. Grants-in-aid 
 The provinces could borrow in the open market on the security of their 
revenues. Prior sanction of Government of India was necessary if a province wanted 
to float a loan outside India or owed any debt to, or guaranteed by, the Government 
of India.  
                                               
24
 Nehru condemned it as legislation “not worth the paper on which it had been printed” and Jinnah 
denounced it as “fundamentally bad, thoroughly rotten and entirely unacceptable.” 
25
 “While under all the previous Government of India Acts, the Government of India was unitary, the Act 
of 1935 prescribed a federation, taking the Provinces and the Indian States as Units”. 
26
 The Indian Constitution, 1950 also follows the same pattern in the case of legislative powers of the 
Union and the State Governments.   
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A significant difference from the earlier Acts was that under the Government of India 
Act, 1935, the revenues and accounts of the provincial governments were detached 
from the Government of India. The provinces were responsible for their ways and 
means position and they could frame their own budgets  
The Government of India Act, 1935 provided the basic structure of Indian fiscal 
federalism. Clarity was brought about the subjects of revenue and expenditure of 
both Central and Provincial Governments. Overlapping of revenue heads was 
minimised. A system was prescribed for the devolution of resources from the centre 
to the provinces in which budgetary deficits of the provinces were taken care of. But 
looking at the functional side, distribution of legislative subjects between the 
governments was unitary and those with more elasticity and buoyancy were granted 
to the centre. On the other hand, all major subjects that had a direct impact upon the 
lives of the people and development of the society were assigned to the provinces. 
The revenue was not commensurate with the expenditure if the provinces were 
taking up development programmes. There was a huge gap in the finances of the 
provinces and the grants-in-aid were not sufficient to make up this difference. This 
paradox prevented the provinces from implementing developmental projects and 
they were forced to concentrate mainly on ordinary administration.   
5. Starting of constitutional fiscal federalism: 1947 to 1950 
The Constituent Assembly was constituted in 1946 for drafting the Constitution for 
India.  It did not make any serious attempt to reorganise the legislative subjects but 
preferred to follow the pattern developed by the Government of India Act, 1935. The 
provisions in the Draft Constitution relating to financial relations between centre and 
provinces were referred to an Expert Committee. Important recommendations of the 
Expert Committee were: 
a. Net proceeds of Income Tax, including Corporation tax, should be shared 
between the centre and the provinces in the ratio of 40:60. 
b. Sharing of the net proceeds of Jute Export Duty with the provinces should be 
dispensed with. 
c. For balancing the revenue structure of the provincial governments, some 
share of central excise duties should be given to them. 
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d. A Finance Commission should be constituted to deal with the matters 
connected with the distribution of revenue between the centre and the provinces 
and the provinces inter se.  
 
Recommendations of the Expert Committee were accepted by the Constituent 
Assembly with minor modifications and they were incorporated in the draft 
Constitution. For the distribution of fiscal powers between the central and the 
provincial governments, the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 were 
more or less adopted. The Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee was set up in 
October 1948 under the chairmanship of V.T. Krishnamachari for achieving financial 
integration of the Part ‘B’ States and agreements were entered into between the 
Government of India and Part ‘B’ States (formerly called Princely States). 
The Government of India (Distribution of Revenues) Order 1948 was effective only 
up to 31 March 1949. Since a Finance Commission could not be appointed 
immediately after the commencement of the Constitution, arrangements were to be 
made for the distribution of income tax and payment of grants-in-aid during the 
interim period. For the period between the commencement of the Constitution and 
the appointment of a Finance Commission, the above areas were regulated by the 
Order of the President. The arrangements for the allocation of income tax and jute 
export duty made by the Government of India immediately after the partition of the 
country caused dissatisfaction among the provinces. In December 1949, these 
matters were referred to C.D. Deshmukh to formulate principles for the devolution of 
income tax among Part A States (formerly British Indian provinces). The Deshmukh 
Award came into operation on 1 April 1950 and remained in force until31 March 
1952. 27 
The First Finance Commission of India was constituted under Article280 of the 
Constitution of India by a Presidential Order dated 22 November 1951, under the 
chairmanship of K.C. Neogy. 
                                               
27
 There was no comprehensive scheme of redistribution under the Deshmukh award. It only 
recommended for a reallocation of the sums released on partition. Accordingly, there was no 
change in the percentage share of Assam, Bombay and Orissa; reduced the shares of Madras by 0 
.5 percent, of U.P. by 1 percent and of Bihar by 0.5 percent; augmented the share of West Bengal 
by 1.5 percent, of Punjab by 0.5 percent. West Bengal was granted Rs. 105 lakhs, Assam Rs. 40 
lakhs, Bihar Rs. 35 lakhs and Orissa Rs. 5 lakhs in lieu of Jute and Jute Goods Export Duty. 
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Conclusion 
It can be seen that the Fiscal Federalism under Indian Constitution is a result of 
historical evolution spreading for almost a century. Over the time, a too rigid unitary 
system with immense scope of discretionary power to the Central Government was 
transformed into a constitutionally regulated federal system. Through various 
commissions, committees and parliamentary enactments this was achieved. While 
drafting a new Constitution for the Indian Republic, the framers preferred to preserve 
the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 with slight modifications in the 
field of financial relations between the centre and the provinces. As the Government 
of India Act, 1935 was unique for its strong centripetal tendencies the same were 
reflected in the new Constitution as well. 
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